



Interagency Primary Information Flow for Addressing Major School Crises.



TANGIPAHOA PARISH
SCHOOL SYSTEM



one team, one purpose



Agenda

Greetings

Objectives

Goals

Introduction of Panelists

NIMS Key Personnel in School and Emergency management

REMS

Panelist Discussion :

Investigative Committee Report on the Robb Elementary School;
what have we learned?

Questions and Answers

Next Steps

One Team



One Purpose



TANGIPAHOA
PARISH SCHOOL
SYSTEM
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PARISH SCHOOL
SYSTEM
TANGIPAHOA



Goal

Emphasize the importance of interagency representatives working collaboratively to build positive relationships with stakeholders to keep students attending our schools safe.

Objectives

Model the importance of positive relationships among interagency agency leaders and stakeholders responsible for addressing significant school crisis matters.

Define roles, responsibilities, and expectations of agency panel representatives present.

Discuss future inter-agency school crisis planning for Tangipahoa Parish.





Our Team



Melissa M. Stilley

Superintendent

Tangipahoa Parish School System



Ronald Genco

Assistant Superintendent

Tangipahoa Parish School System



Gary T. Porter

Director of Student Services

Tangipahoa Parish School System



Our Team



Rochell D. Bates

Mayor
Town of Kentwood

Due Process Hearing Officer
TPSS



Dennis Darouse

Director

Emergency Numbers Professionals
(ENP's)



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Frank Edwards III

Chief of Police

Town of Independence



Our Team



Lendrick Francois

Chief of Police

City of Amite



Michelle Gallo

Executive Director

Crime Stoppers of Tangipahoa



Alexa M. Hookfin

Coordinator of Student
Services/CWA

TPSS



Our Team



Unseld Johnson, Sr.

Sargent

School Resource Officers



Dawson Primes

Director

Homeland Security and Emergency

Tangipahoa Parish



Guy Recotta Jr.

Clerk of Court/Judicial Administrator

City Court of Hammond

Collaboration and Team Building



Five Preparedness Missions



Four Phases of Emergency Management



**Key Components
of NIMS**



Four Phases of Emergency Management



Incident Command System Roles



EXECUTIVE LEADERS

Executive Leaders must be familiar with the comprehensive systems supporting emergency management, even though they may not have a designated role in the incident command system. **Executive Leaders** are often responsible for making financial, administrative, and managerial decisions supporting the school or IHE emergency management program and will likely have very high-level responsibilities before and after an incident, as opposed to command responsibilities in the field during an actual incident response.

NOTE: Depending upon the unique school, LEA, or IHE, **Executive Leaders** may include:

- Institution President
- Superintendent
- Provost
- Chancellor
- Principal

GENERAL PERSONNEL

General Personnel are those with any role in emergency preparedness, incident management, or response.

NOTE: Depending on the school, LEA or IHE campus, **General Personnel** may include:

- Emergency Management (ICS) Team members
- Nurses and Health Officials
- Counselors, Psychologists, Psychiatrists
- School Resource Officers
- School Security Officials
- [Information] Technology Specialists
- Bus Drivers
- Administrators
- Educators/Faculty
- Coaches and Athletic Staff
- Facilities, Housing, and Food Preparation Staff
- Campus Citizen Emergency Response
- Team (CERT) members
- Resource staff, paraprofessionals, and support personnel

COMMAND STAFF

Command Staff are personnel assigned to lead any key campus emergency management effort; they have a specific role within the ICS.

NOTE: Depending on the school, LEA, or IHE **Command Staff** may include the following personnel:

- Public Information Officer
- Safety Officer
- Liaison Officer
- Any staff that plays a vital role on the operations, planning, logistics, or finance/administration branches of the ICS team for the school, LEA, or IHE.

INCIDENT MANAGERS

Personnel with a leadership role in command (e.g., district, school or IHE Incident Commander, School Police Chief). These individuals are typically obligated to command and manage incidents that occur on the school or IHE campus in the absence of traditional incident response personnel (local Fire Chief, local Police Chief). These personnel also include those school officials, including school police, who would likely be integrated into a more advanced ICS role (e.g., unified command) should it become necessary.


NOTE: Depending on the unique school, LEA, or IHE, **Incident Managers** would likely include the following personnel:

- Director of School/Campus Security
- School/Campus Chief of Police School Security Chief

REMS Steps in the Planning Process



Steps in the Planning Process





1. Uvalde CISD and Robb Elementary

a. Communications and lockdown alerts:

i. Poor Wi-Fi connectivity in Robb Elementary likely delayed the lockdown alert through the Raptor application.

ii. Once the alert was sent, not all teachers received it immediately for a variety of reasons including wi-fi coverage, whether the teacher used the Raptor phone application (as opposed to logging in through a web browser), and whether the teacher was carrying a phone at the time.

iii. No one used the school intercom as another means to communicate the lockdown.

iv. As a result, not all teachers received timely notice of the lockdown, including the teacher in Room 111.

b. Effect of bailouts:

i. The frequency of less-serious bailout-related alerts in Uvalde diluted the significance of alerts and dampened everyone's readiness to act on alerts.

ii. In response to the May 24, 2022, lockdown alert at Robb Elementary, the initial reaction of many administrators, teachers, and law enforcement responders was that it likely was a less-dangerous bailout.



c. Doors and locks:

- i. Robb Elementary had recurring problems with maintaining its doors and locks.
 - ii. In particular, the locking mechanism to Room 111 was widely known to be faulty, yet it was not repaired.
 1. The Robb Elementary principal, her assistant responsible for entering maintenance work orders, the teacher in Room 111, other teachers in the fourth-grade building, and even many fourth grade students widely knew of the problem with the lock to Room 111.
 2. Nevertheless, no one placed a work order to repair the lock— not the principal, her secretary, the teacher to Room 111, or anyone else.
 - iii. Robb Elementary had a culture of noncompliance with safety policies requiring doors to be kept locked, which turned out to be fatal.
 1. Exterior doors.
 - a. Teachers at Robb Elementary often used rocks to prop open exterior doors.



b. The west door to the west building was supposed to be continuously locked. When the attacker approached on May 24, 2022, it was unlocked, and he was able to enter the building there.

c. If the door had been locked as policy required, the attacker likely would have been slowed for some period of time as he either circumvented the lock or moved to another point of entry into the building.

2. Interior classroom doors.

a. Teachers at Robb Elementary commonly left interior doors unlocked for convenience, and they also used magnets and other methods to circumvent door locks.

b. The doors to Rooms 111 and 112 were required to be locked at all times, and in a lockdown, the teachers were supposed to check that they were locked.

i. A teacher in Room 112 was seen locking her classroom door after the lockdown alert.

ii. The door to Room 111 probably was not locked. The teacher in Room 111 does not recall hearing the lockdown alert. The door required special effort to lock it, and the teacher has no memory of having done so. The attacker apparently did not have to take any actions to overcome a locked door before entering the classrooms.

c. If the door to Room 111 had been locked, the attacker likely would have been slowed for some time as he either circumvented the lock or took some other alternative course of action.



2. Information that was known or knowable about the attacker

a. Home and family:

- i. The attacker had an unstable home life with no father figure and a mother struggling with a substance abuse disorder.
- ii. The attacker's family moved often and lived in relative poverty.
- iii. The attacker developed sociopathic and violent tendencies, but he received no mental health assistance
- iv. Various members of the attacker's family were aware during the time leading up to the attacker's 18th birthday that he was estranged from his mother and that he had asked for help in buying guns through straw purchases that would have been illegal. Family members uniformly refused to buy guns for him.
- v. During the week between his 18th birthday and the events of May 24, 2022, the attacker expressed suicidal ideation to a cousin, who talked to him and did not believe he was an imminent suicide risk.
- vi. During the week between his 18th birthday and the events of May 24, 2022, the attacker's grandparents and other family members became aware that the attacker had bought guns. The grandparents demanded that the guns be removed from their home.



b. School:

- i. The attacker struggled academically throughout his time in school.
 - ii. The school made no meaningful intervention with the attacker before he was involuntarily withdrawn for poor academic performance and excessive absences.
 - iii. The attacker had few disciplinary issues at school, but he was suspended once for a fight.
 - iv. Due to his excessive absences, there apparently was no information actually known to the school district that should have identified this attacker as a threat to any school campus.
- c. Law enforcement: There apparently was no information actually known to local Uvalde law enforcement should have identified this attacker as a threat to any school campus before May 24, 2022.
- d. Friends and acquaintances: Some of the attacker's social media contacts received messages from the attacker related to guns, suggesting that he was going to do something they would hear about in the news, and even referring to attacking a school.



e. Social media:

- i. Reports suggest that some social-media users may have reported the attacker’s threatening behavior to the relevant social media platforms. The social media platforms appear to have not done anything in response to restrict the attacker’s social media access or report his behavior to law enforcement authorities.
 - ii. The services used by Uvalde CISD to monitor social media for threats did not provide any alert of threatening behavior by the attacker.
- f. Firearms and ammunition sellers: There was no legal impediment to the attacker buying two AR-15-style rifles, 60 magazines, and over 2,000 rounds of ammunition when he turned 18. The ATF was not required to notify the local sheriff of the multiple purchases.

3. Law enforcement response on May 24, 2022

- a. There was no law enforcement officer on the Robb Elementary campus when the attacker came over the fence and toward the school.
- b. Citizens at the scene quickly alerted local law enforcement about a vehicle accident, a man with a gun, and shots fired near the Robb Elementary campus.
- c. As initially reported by Uvalde Police dispatch and as understood by most initial responders, the incident began off-campus and as one that would have been in the jurisdiction of the Uvalde Police Department. Uvalde Police officers were among the first, if not the first, law enforcement responders on the scene as a man firing a gun moved toward Robb Elementary School.



- d. As the situation developed and responders received more information, it became apparent that the threat moved on to the school campus and within the jurisdiction of the Uvalde CISD Police Department.
- e. Multiple law enforcement officers arrived at Robb Elementary within a few minutes of the attacker coming over the fence.
- f. A Uvalde Police Department officer saw a person dressed in black and thought it might have been the attacker. From a distance of over 100 yards, that officer requested permission to shoot. Subsequent analysis suggests that the person in black was a school coach, and the officer did not have an opportunity to stop the attacker by shooting him before he entered the west building.
- g. Robb Elementary School Coach Yvette Silva acted heroically and almost certainly saved lives by alerting the school to the attacker's advance. Most fourth-grade classes successfully locked down as a result of her quick response.

Investigative Committee Interim Report 2022 on the Robb Elementary Shooting Conclusion Statements (Continued)



- h. After entering through the unlocked west door, the attacker had about three minutes in the west building before first responders arrived at the building, including approximately two and a half minutes during which the attacker is estimated to have fired over 100 rounds.
- i. The initial responders to the west building heard gunfire and encountered a hallway with a fog of drywall debris, bullet holes, and empty rifle casings. They converged on Rooms 111 and 112, which they identified as the location of the attacker. They acted appropriately by attempting to breach the classrooms and stop the attacker. The attacker immediately repelled them with a burst of rifle fire from inside the classrooms.
- j. The responders immediately began to assess options to breach the classroom, but they lost critical momentum by treating the scenario as a “barricaded subject” instead of with the greater urgency attached to an “active shooter” scenario.
- k. It actually was an “active shooter” scenario because the attacker was preventing critically injured victims from getting medical attention.



- i. An active shooter scenario differs from a barricaded-subject scenario in that law enforcement officers responding to an active shooter are trained to prioritize the safety of innocent victims over the safety of law enforcement responders.

- ii. At first, the first responders did not have “reliable evidence” about whether there were injured victims inside Rooms 111 and 112, although circumstantial evidence strongly suggested that possibility, including the fact that the attacker had fired many rounds inside classrooms at a time when students were in attendance.

- iii. The ALERRT training “reliable evidence” standard does not align with the “reasonable officer” standard applied by ALERRT in its preliminary and partial report.

Investigative Committee Interim Report 2022 on the Robb Elementary Shooting Conclusion Statements (Continued)



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 - ii. At first, the first responders did not have “reliable evidence” about whether there were injured victims inside Rooms 111 and 112, although circumstantial evidence strongly suggested that possibility, including the fact that the attacker had fired many rounds inside classrooms at a time when students were in attendance.
 - iii. The ALERRT training “reliable evidence” standard does not align with the “reasonable officer” standard applied by ALERRT in its preliminary and partial report.
- 1. Uvalde CISD’s active shooter policy called for Uvalde CISD Police Chief Arredondo to be the incident commander in any active shooter response.**
- i. Chief Arredondo was one of the first responders to arrive at the west building.
 - ii. In the initial response to the incident, Chief Arredondo was actively engaged in the effort to “stop the killing” up to the point when the attacker was located in Rooms 111 and 112, and the attacker fired on responding officers.
 - iii. By this time, there were dozens of officers on the scene, but Chief Arredondo did not assume his preassigned responsibility of incident command, which would have entailed informing other officers that he was in command and also leaving the building to exercise command, beginning with establishing an incident command post.



- iv. Instead, he remained in the hallway where he lacked reliable communication with other elements of law enforcement, and he was unable to effectively implement staging or command and control of the situation.
- m. Over the course of the next hour, hundreds of law enforcement officers arrived at the scene.
- i. The scene was chaotic, without any person obviously in charge or directing the law enforcement response.
- ii. To the extent any officers considered Chief Arredondo to be the overall incident commander, they also should have recognized that was inconsistent with him remaining inside the building.
- iii. There was an overall lackadaisical approach by law enforcement at the scene. For many, that was because they were given and relied upon inaccurate information. For others, they had enough information to know better.
- n. Despite obvious deficiencies in command and control at the scene which should have been recognized by other law enforcement responders, none approached Chief Arredondo or any of the officers around him or subordinate to him to affirmatively offer assistance with incident command.
- o. Chief Arredondo and the officers around him at the south end of the building were focused on gaining access to the classrooms (through the use of a breaching tool, a key, or other means) and protective equipment for officers (through rifle-rated ballistic shields, flashbangs, etc.).

Investigative Committee Interim Report 2022 on the Robb Elementary Shooting Conclusion Statements (Continued)



- p. Meanwhile, dozens of law enforcement officers were assembling in the hallway on the north side of the building, stacking up for an assault on the classrooms, and mostly waiting for further instructions pending the arrival of protective gear and breaching equipment.
- q. While 911 received communications from victims inside Rooms 111 and 112, Chief Arredondo did not learn about it because of his failure to establish a reliable method of receiving critical information from outside the building.
- r. Eventually, Chief Arredondo came to understand there probably were casualties inside Rooms 111 and 112. Even if he had received information of surviving injured victims in the classrooms, it is unclear that he would have done anything differently to act “more urgently.”
- s. U.S. Marshals provided a rifle-rated shield and it arrived around 12:20 p.m., approximately 30 minutes before the classroom was finally breached.
- t. While officers acted on the assumption that the doors to Rooms 111 and 112 were locked, as they were designed to be, nobody tested that assumption.
- u. Room 111’s door probably was not effectively locked shut.
- v. Chief Arredondo did not actually exercise tactical incident command over the BORTAC team, nor did the BORTAC team seek instruction from Chief Arredondo.
- w. By the time the BORTAC team breached the classrooms, the tactical command inside the building had been de facto assumed by BORTAC.

Investigative Committee Interim Report 2022 on the Robb Elementary Shooting Conclusion Statements (Continued)



x. Acting on effectively the same information available to Chief Arredondo, including an assumption of injured victims in the room, the BORTAC commander on scene waited until arranging a rifle-rated shield and obtaining a working master key before attempting to breach the classrooms.

y. The Committee has not received medical evidence that would inform a judgment about whether breaching the classroom sooner than the approximately 73 minutes that passed between the first responders' initial arrival at the west building and their eventual breach of the classrooms could have saved lives or mitigated injuries.

i. As described above, it is likely that most of the deceased victims perished immediately during the attacker's initial barrage of gunfire.

ii. However, given the information known about victims who survived through the time of the breach and who later died on the way to the hospital, it is plausible that some victims could have survived if they had not had to wait 73 additional minutes for rescue.



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Next Steps



Questions



In Memory of



Nevaeh Bravo

Jacklyn Cazares

Makenna Elrod

Jose Flores Jr.

Eliahna Garcia

Irma Garcia

Uziyah Garcia

Amerie Jo Garza

Xavier Lopez

Jayce Luevanos

Tess Mata

Maranda Mathis

Eva Mireles

Alithia Ramirez

Annabell Rodriquez

Maite Rodriquez

Alexandria Rubio

Layla Salazar

Jailah Silguero

Eliahna Torres

Rojelio Torres



Thank You

TANGIPAOA PROUD

#TEAM TANGI!



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SCHOOL SYSTEM